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In the decade-long debate about the nature of the European Union, 
multilevel governance is now the consensus model. Its most popular 
variant argues that the EU is a “regulatory state” which mainly deals 
with market integration but leaves issues of high political salience 
such as taxation to the member states. While there is indeed no trace 
of an EU power to tax, we show that contrary to the consensus view 
the EU by no means leaves taxation to the member states. Instead, it 
massively constrains their tax base, tax rates, and tax systems. We 
conclude that the EU does not only regulate markets but also core 
political issues such as taxation. The combination of the European 
regulation of taxation and the maintanance of member state power to 
tax is an essential characteristic of multilevel governance in the EU. 
1. Introduction 
The exploration of the “nature of the beast”
1 has puzzled students of the EU 
for many decades and has generated a long debate.
2 This debate is not a 
mere exercise in classification. It is instead about finding a substantial 
answer to one of the most fundamental questions of EU studies and also of 
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EU politics – the relationship between the EU and its member states. More 
than forty years ago, the early protagonists of the debate proposed strongly 
diverging alternative views of either a strengthening or a weakening of the 
state and of a zero-sum relationship between the European and the national 
level. While there were also more complex views, much of the debate was 
framed in these terms.
3 During the last decade, the once heated debates 
seem to have given way to a new standard model which conceives of the EU 
as a system of multilevel governance.  
In our view, the widespread use of the concept of multilevel governance 
does not provide a satisfactory answer to the question about the relationship 
between the EU and its member states. In the next section, we argue that the 
current usage of the concept actually comprises two distinct meanings. The 
first sees multilevel governance as a gradual practice of power sharing 
between levels of governance which is common to most larger polities 
including states, the EU and possibly international organizations. This 
position explicitly rejects categorical arguments about a weakening or 
strengthening of the state. The second conceives of multilevel governance in 
the EU as a highly specific form of power sharing which gives the EU the 
power to regulate markets but leaves essential political tasks such as 
defense, policing, welfare spending or taxation to the member states. 
Independently from their positions within the large multilevel governance 
camp, virtually all authors agree that the EU has very little powers in the 
field of taxation. 
In the following sections, we take a closer empirical look at this “no 
taxation” thesis. We first analyze the development of the EU’s income and 
find that initial weak beginnings of a financial resource independent from 
the member states have over time been replaced by an increasing reliance on 
direct contributions from the member states. There is no trace of an EU 
power to tax. This seems to confirm the prevailing conceptualization of the 
EU which is strong in market regulation but leaves issues of high domestic 
concern such as taxation to the member states. However, this is not the 
whole story. In the forth section we present a comprehensive analysis of EU 
secondary tax legislation and of ECJ rulings relating to taxation between 
1958 and 2007. Here, we find that contrary to the conventional wisdom the 
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EU massively constrains the member states’ tax base, tax rates, and tax 
systems.  
Our empirical findings clearly disconfirm the widespread “no taxation” 
thesis: The EU has strong regulatory control over taxation and by no means 
leaves it to the member states. The significance of this result goes beyond 
the field of taxation. We claim that the regulatory state model of multilevel 
governance in the EU must be extended. Regulation at the EU is not limited 
to market regulation but reaches into political and redistributional issues. 
Operationally, these policies are still carried out by the member states. 
However, the EU strongly regulates the terms of what member states can 
do. In the European multilevel system, the state is neither weakened nor 
strengthened but becomes embedded into a larger regulatory structure. 
2. Multilevel Governance and Taxation 
Since the 1990s, an increasing number of scholars writing about the nature 
of the Euro-polity have come to agree that it is a system of multilevel 
governance. This conceptualization now seems close to a consensus view on 
the Euro-polity which is not only shared by those who have made the 
argument for quite some time
4 but also by those who were believed to 
oppose it.
5 Despite attempts to revitalise federalist thinking on the EU,
6 
there seems to be no serious alternative to the prevailing conceptualization 
that the EU is a multilevel system.  
The increasing use of the term has not, however, made it more precise. 
On the contrary, its unclear content may be the reason for its very success in 
recent years. If “multilevel system” simply refers to a political system with 
two levels of government, virtually any political system is a multilevel 
system and not much follows from this classification. As a response to the 
danger of conceptual stretching, two clearly distinct ways to fill the term 
with content have emerged in the literature.  
The first conceptualization of a multilevel system provides an analytical 
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approach for looking at the distribution of authority between levels of 
government and changes of this distribution over time. In the field of EU 
studies, this approach has been pioneered by Leon Lindberg who measured 
the locus of decision-making in the EU with an ordinal scale ranging form 1 
(all decisions national) to 5 (all decisions European) over a number of 
policy fields and over time.
7 His scale has been used and modified several 
times in later years to capture the evolution of the EU’s policy scope and the 
distribution of powers between the European and the national level.
8 
The scale is based on an incrementalist notion of power-sharing across 
levels of government. Its main thrust in EU studies is that it rejects the 
categorical distinction between the state on the one hand and other forms a 
polity on the other and replaces it by a gradual continuum of the sharing of 
authority. The main insight of this approach is not that virtually all political 
systems are indeed multilevel systems but rather to point at the specific 
configuration of power sharing across policy areas and its change over time. 
The great advantage of this view is that it helps to overcome ideological 
battles over the “true nature” of the Euro-polity by looking at empirical data. 
One disadvantages of this approach is its breadth: If every polity is 
somehow a multilevel system the debate on the nature of the Euro-polity is 
not really solved but merely transferred to the interpretation of the scores of 
the different scales. A second disadvantage is that it does not distinguish 
between the importance of different policy fields for which authority 
distributions are measured. In other words, are research, agriculture or 
competition policy really as important as defence, taxation or monetary 
policy? 
The second conceptualization of multilevel governance in the EU takes a 
different view. It conceives of multilevel governance in the EU as a 
substantive model of a polity and not only as an analytical approach to 
power sharing between levels of government. In this view, the “multi-level 
governance system of the EU is the only distinctively new form of state 
organization to emerge and prosper since the rise of the democratic social 
welfare state at the turn of the twentieth century”.
9 This multilevel system is 
not a federal superstate which simply replicates the main state tasks on a 
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larger territorial scale. Instead, it is a regulatory polity with a highly specific 
division of tasks between the European and the member state level. This 
institutional setup is neither a historical accident nor a mere transitory 
phase. As Giandomenico Majone has forcefully argued, the EU has 
developed into a regulatory polity for two reasons.
10 First, he argues, there 
was a general trend in advanced industrial states away from taxing and 
spending policies as the main instruments of governments towards 
regulation and law-making, in other words a move from the “positive” or 
“interventionist” to the “regulatory” state. Although this trend was 
reinforced by increasing competition and economic integration within the 
EU, it was not initiated by the EU. Only in a second stage, the European 
Commission strategically used regulation in order to increase its own 
policy-making authority. As the EU budget was very small as compared to 
member state budgets, its growth tightly controlled by member states and a 
large portion of it devoted to specific policies by the EU Treaties or 
secondary legislation, large-scale spending policies which governments 
normally use to set political priorities or to increase political support were 
unavailable political options for the EU Commission. It had no choice but to 
focus on regulation for setting policy priorities and for increasing its own 
policy-making authority. Although regulatory policies may lead to 
substantial costs for enterprises, they had hardly any impact on the EU 
budget.  
As a result of both factors, the EU developed into a regulatory polity. 
This is the specific form multilevel governance takes in the EU. The EU 
level has far-reaching policy authority in the field of market-regulation. 
With the Commission monopoly of legislative initiative, qualified majority 
voting in the Council, the European Parliament as a co-legislator, and a 
hierarchical legal system with the pro-market jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Justice, the EU level enjoyed a high degree of independence from 
the will of individual member states.
11 Other typical tasks of modern states 
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such as redistributive welfare policies, policing, taxation, or defense are 
largely carried out by the member states without much EU involvement. In 
other words, the second conceptualization of multilevel governance sees a 
fundamental feature of the EU in its “far-reaching separation of state power 
from market power”.
12 In this view, which is the prevailing 
conceptualization of multilevel governance in the EU, the Euro-polity is 
clearly distinct from a federation because federations also have “state 
power” in the areas of defense, policing, or taxation, to name but the most 
important ones. The EU does not have these powers. 
The common conviction of both conceptualizations of multilevel 
governance disussed above is that the EU has no taxing power. In Tanja 
Börzel’s analysis of the level and scope of EU policy-making over time, 
taxation constantly scores 1.5 from the Rome Treaty of 1958 to the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty of 2004, meaning that member states control it almost 
completely.
13 Schmidt finds few signs for a Europeanization of German tax 
policy.
14 For Moravcsik, taxation is largely excluded from the EU policy 
agenda.
15 Stone Sweet states that “the EC governs principally through 
making rules …; it has little capacity to govern through taxation …”.
16 Even 
for those who do not share the multilevel polity view, taxation is still 
“firmly in the hands of national governments”.
17 Tsoukalis bemoans that 
with respect to taxation, the EU has spent an “inordinate amount of time 
with rather little to show for it.”
18 Hix nicely summarizes the prevailing 
view: “The EU is a multilevel system of government, which allows 
European citizens to make decisions about regulation of the continent-wide 
market at the European level while maintaining power over taxation and 
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spending at the national level”.
19 
This “no taxation” thesis can easily be subjected to empirical scrutiny. 
This is what we well do in the remainder of the paper. The significance of 
such an analysis goes beyond the test of an empirical claim about the role of 
the EU in a particular policy field. Taxation is not a policy field like any 
other. Instead, the power to tax is widely believed to be a defining and 
essential characteristic of the modern state, a feature which distinguishes the 
state from other forms of political organization. For Karl Marx, it was the 
“source of life” of the modern state.
20 Many writers have argued that the 
states lives almost exclusively on tax revenue. The structure and level of 
such revenue determines to a large extent what it can do and what it cannot 
do, how many civil servants it can hire, how ambitiously it can define its 
policy goals, and by what means it can pursue them. A fiscal sociology of 
the state
21 can thus yield important insights for understanding the state – and 
by analogy also about other types of polity. 
Precisely because the power to tax is so fundamental to the state, changes 
of the state are to be reflected in (and often caused by) changes in taxation. 
This is also the reason why so many analysts are firmly convinced that 
changes in other policy fields notwithstanding, EU member states will 
preserve their policy-making autonomy in the field of taxation. The analysis 
of taxation is therefore one of the best starting points for analyzing the 
structure of the European multilevel system. Unfortunately, taxation is 
generally considered to be dry, technical and boring, and students of 
European integration usually pay scant attention to it.
22 As a result, the 
widespread “no taxation” thesis lacks systematic empirical support. To 
provide such a systematic analysis of taxation in the EU with a view to 
obtain a better understanding of multilevel governance in the EU is the task 
of the following two sections. 
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3. No EU Taxing Power 
On a first look, there is substantial evidence for the “no taxation” thesis. 
Unlike its member states, the EU has neither the legal right nor the 
administrative means to impose compuslory payments on individuals or 
corporations. It has no taxing power. This is even more remarkable because 
the introduction of a genuine EU tax is a perennial issue in European 
politics. The Commission, supported by various expert panels and pro-
European policy-makers, has fought for it since the 1960s. It claimed that 
European level taxes would improve market integration, facilitate the 
operation of monetary union, and bring the EU closer to the citizen by 
establishing a direct fiscal link to them.
23  
These efforts did not bring about success. Today, the EU is no closer to 
having a tax of its own than the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) was back in the 1950s. In fact, it is even further away because, as 
we will show, the importance of tax-like supranational levies for funding the 
Community budget has decreased, and the importance of national 
contributions has increased over time. Over time, there is a pervasive trend 
towards intergovernmentalism in the financing of the EU. Its so-called own 
resource system gravitates towards a funding scheme consisting of national 
contributions which is essentially similar to that of international institutions 
such as the UN, and fundamentally dissimilar to the tax systems of federal, 
let alone unitary nation states. 
The ECSC Treaty of 1951 still contained the seeds of a genuine 
European power to tax.
24 It empowered the High Authority to impose 
supranational levies on the production of coal and steel, and gave it 
considerable discretion ot autonomously set the rate and base of these 
levies. The levies were collected directly by the ECSC from individual coal 
and seel companies and without any administrative assistance from the 
member states. This system bore a close resemblance to supranational 
taxes.
25  
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Already the Treaty on the European Economic Community (EEC) of 
1957 returned to an intergovernmental mode of financing European 
institutions and policies based on national contributions by the member 
states. It did, however, call for an eventual replacement of this system by a 
new, presumably supranational, system of “own Community resources”.
26 
In 1970, the Council decided that customs duties and agricultural levies 
were to become the first two own resources to the Community. As in the 
case of the ECSC levies, the rate and the base of these so-called traditional 
own resources are set by decisions on the European level in the framework 
of the common commercial policy and the common agricultural policy 
respectively. Like the ECSC levies, they are charged directly on economic 
agents (importers and agricultural producers), thus creating a direct, tax-like 
fiscal link between the Community and individual or corporate citizens. 
Unlike ECSC levies, however, the traditional own resources are collected by 
national rather than European authorities and pass through national budgets 
rather than directly to the European budget.
27 Since the agents paying 
customs duties or agricultural levies are mostly corporate actors and do nto 
represent the European citizenship at large, the traditional own resources did 
not create the visible fiscal link between the European institutions and the 
citizens which the Commission and other ardent supporters of a federal 
Europe had longed for. Also, they serve primarily non-fiscal objectives such 
as trade liberalization and the stabilization of agricultural prices. It was 
obvious from the beginning that they would not be sufficient to match the 
rising revenue requirements of the Community. 
The so-called VAT
28 resource, introduced in 1979, was supposed to 
alleviate both problems. Envisaged as a European deduction of up to 1 per 
cent from national VATs (the so-called “base-on-base method”), it would 
have allowed the Community to tap into a buoyant source of revenue and at 
the same time would have increased the Community’s profile as a revenue 
raiser in its own right. However, the implementation of the base-on-base 
method would also have required a complete harmonization of national 
VAT bases because otherwise member states would have been able to 
reduce their contributions to the European budget by reducing their VAT 
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base. While the Council achieved a substantial approximation in 1977, a 
complete harmonization proved elusive. This made the deduction approach 
unfeasible and tipped the scales in favor of a purely statistical approach to 
collecting the VAT resource (the so-called “revenue method”).
29  
The revenue method was convenient because it was easy to administer 
but it changed the character of the VAT resource from a direct European 
charge on final consumers to a national contribution by the member states. 
Despite its name, the VAT resource is not directly linked to the VAT 
payments of European consumers. It represents a national payment 
obligation of the member states rather than an individual payment obligation 
of EU citizens. In essence, it is a purely statistical construct, calculated from 
harmonized data on aggregate national consumption, paid out of general tax 
revenue rather than VAT revenue alone, and transferred to the EU in 
monthly instalments. In view of these factors, critical observers consider the 
VAT resource as “revenue dressed up as an own resource”
30 but not as a 
genuine own resource. The VAT resource has nothing to do with a 
European tax but is in fact a national contribution which is calculated in a 
complex way. 
The introduction of the so-called GNI-resource
31 in 1988 reinforced the 
drift from supranational levies to national contributions. In contrast to the 
VAT resource which at least at first sight resembles a tax, the GNI resource 
was conceived right from the beginning as a transfer from national 
treasuries and not as a direct charge on European citizens. It is calculated on 
the basis of harmonized data on the gross national income of the member 
states without even nominal reference to microeconomic events or actors. 
While initially planned as a residual source of finance, the GNI resource has 
turned into the key stone of the own resource system. In 2007, it accounted 
for roughly 70 per cent of all own resources. If the VAT resource is 
included, it becomes clear that almost 85 per cent of the EU budget derive 
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from national contributions. Only 15 per cent derives from tax-like income 
which is levied on a highly selective subset of society.  
In short, there is a pervasive trend in the EU’s finances away from direct 
charges on individual or corporate citizens towards national contributions of 
the member states, in other words away from a genuine supranational power 
to tax towards an intergovernmental revenue system. While the High 
Authority of the ECSC enjoyed considerable discretion and could 
autonomously determine both the base and the rate of ECSC levies, the 
Commission can only propose rates and bases of EU own resources which 
then have to be adopted unanimously by the Council and ratified by the 
national parliaments of the member states.
32  
 The trend towards national contributions in the financing of the EU is 
reflected in concerns about inter-nation distributive justice and also 
propelled by these concerns. They surfaced for the first time after British 
entry in 1973, and almost paralyzed the EU after Margaret Thatcher 
demanded “our money back” in 1979. The budget rebate for the UK solved 
this particular problem in 1984 but at the price of drawing other member 
states’ attention to their budgetary net-positions as well.
33 By increasing the 
number of net-contributors to the EU budget, consecutive rounds of 
enlargement further increased the salience of distributive conflicts among 
the member states. As a consequence, the main cleavage in European 
budgetary debates is not between social classes as within the member states 
but between these states themselves. The normative reference point is inter-
nation equity and the principle of the national ability to pay as in other 
international institutions, not inter-person equity and the principle of the 
individual ability to pay as in domestic politics. This is reflected in cross-
national differences in contribution rates to the VAT resource. Nowadays, 
the UK is not the only country with a budget rebate. Special rates apply to 
Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, and a base cap is granted 
to member states with large VAT bases.
34 The increasing 
intergovernmentalism in the EU budget is also reflected in its size. While in 
Western federal states, the huge task expansion of the federal government 
since the late 19th century was accompanied by a huge expansion of the 
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federal budget,
35 the EU’s task expansion since the early 1990s was 
accompanied by a stagnation of the budget.  
A number of observers percieve this trend as pathological. In the eyes of 
the Commission, it fosters “a narrow juste retour stance” of the member 
states and deflects attention from the benefits of EU policies for Europe as a 
whole. A direct fiscal link between the European institutions and the citizen 
could help to reduce this bias and vindicate the EU as “a Union of Member 
states  and citizens”.
36 The quest for a genuine European tax goes on.
37 
However, its visionary appeal testifies to its lack of political plausibility. 
The creation of a genuine European taxing power is not on the agenda 
because it would bestow a degree of stateness on the EU that seems ever 
more unacceptable to the member states after several rounds of enlargement. 
This all but rules out a genuine European tax and makes the creation of a 
direct fiscal link between European institutions and citizens exceedingly 
difficult. 
4. The EU’s Regulatory Power Over Taxation 
While the EU has no taxes of ist own, it has the power to regulate the taxes 
of the member states. This power to regulate goes far beyond what is 
usually understood when scholars speak of the EU as a regulatory polity. It 
is implied by the EU’s competence for the Internal Market. The Internal 
Market is defined as an “area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured”
38. To 
complete this market, the EU has to intervene in national policies creating 
such frontiers. Since goods, persons, services, and capital constitute the 
major tax bases of the member states (in fact there is hardly anything else to 
tax), this resudual European power to regulate amounts to a very broad 
mandate covering all major taxes. As we will show in this section, the EU 
institutions have used this mandate to slowly assert considerable control 
over national taxation. The member states continue to levy taxes but EU 
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institutions increasingly shape them. Two instruments are particularly 
important in this regard, namely the secondary tax legislation of the 
Commission and the Council (see section 4.1) and the case law of the 
European Court of Justice (see section 4.2). In the following, we provide 
descriptive evidence of the growing use of these instrument and of its 
constraining effect on national taxation. 
4.2. Secondary Tax Legislation 
The founding fathers of the EEC clearly understood that market integration 
would require European tax policy coordination
39 but were concerned to 
keep the EU’s legislative authority limited in this area. The EC Treaty gives 
some law making powers in the field of taxation to EU institutions but 
imposes strict substantive and procedural constraints on them. 
Substantively, it premises EU tax legislation on the needs of market 
integration. It empowers the Council to harmonize national tax laws but for 
one purpose only: to ensure the proper functioning of the Internal Market.
40 
The fiscal and distributive considerations which animate most domestic tax 
policy debates are thus systematically excluded from the European tax 
policy agenda. Of course, once a market integration rationale for tax 
harmonization has been established, other policy considerations of a fiscal, 
economic, environmental, or social nature also come into play.
41 It is, 
however, important to note that these considerations alone cannot justify 
formal acts of tax harmonization. Procedurally, the Treaty subjects tax 
matters to unanimous decision-making. As a result, each member state 
enjoys veto power.
42 It is important to stress that these substantive and 
procedural constraints have never been relaxed since the ratification of the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957. Proposals to introduce qualified majority voting 
invariably met with vocal resistance from sovereignty-minded states such as 
the UK. Arguably, taxation is now the policy field with the strongest degree 
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of intergovernmentalist decision-making at least in the first pillar of the 
EU.
43 As it is mainly concerned with market integration, the first pillar is 
usually characterized by widespread usage of qualified majority voting. 
Qualified majority voting has also been constantly extended to new policy 
areas over time. The fact that despite this general trend the provisions on 
taxation have not seen any major change during the last fifty years is a 
strong indication for the desire of at least some member states to keep the 
EU out of taxation. 
However, these strict Treaty provisions did not prevent a significant 
growth of secondary tax legislation. Table 1 provides a quantitative 
summary of all binding secondary tax acts ever issued by EU institutions. It 
highlights four trends. 
 
 
-- Table 1 about here -- 
 
 
First, the production of secondary tax law has increased enormously. 
While the EU of six issued only two tax acts in its first decade, the EU of 15 
and later of 25 member states passed almost 200 tax acts between 1998 and 
2007. The strict substantive and procedural limits on tax legislation imposed 
by the Treaty have not prevented that the adoption of secondary tax 
legislation is now a routine affair in EU politics. 
Second, the number of tax areas covered by secondary tax law has also 
increased. In the 1960s, the focus of EU tax legislation was exclusively on 
turnover taxation and the introduction of a common VAT system.
44 In the 
1970s and 1980s, EU tax legislation extended to excises. The Council 
agreed on common rules for indirect tax exemptions for individual 
travellers,
45 and for tobacco taxation, and also made its first cautious 
advance into the field of administrative cooperation.
46 In the 1990s, it 
entered the corporate tax field by pasing two directives on the tax treatment 
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of multinational companies.
47 In 2003, EU tax legislation also extended into 
personal income tax with the so-called savings tax directive.
48 As a result, 
the four major taxes (VAT, excises, personal income tax and corporate tax) 
which together account for roughly 85 per cent of total tax revenue
49 in the 
EU-27 are now covered by EU tax law. However, as Table 1 also shows, the 
coverage is very uneven. The vast majority of secondary EU tax law 
concerns indirect taxation (i.e., VAT and excises) while the number fo 
direct tax acts (corporate and personal income tax) is rather low. Closer 
inspection reveals that the systems, base definitions, rate structures and 
administrative procedures of VAT and excise taxes are regulated 
comprehensively and in great detail while the harmonization of direct 
taxation remains rather sketchy. The corporate tax directives focus on 
selected aspects of the tax treatment of multinational companies but do not 
deal with the corporate tax base in general or any other aspect of corporate 
taxation. Harmonization in personal taxation is narrowly limited to the tax 
treatment of individual cross-border savings. The difference in detail is also 
reflected in the different length of the directives. While the new VAT 
systems directive
50 alone covers 118 pages in the EU’s Official Journal, the 
three corporate tax directives
51 taken together cover only sixteen pages. 
Third, the variety of legal instruments has grown. In the first thirty years 
of integration, the directive was virtually the only instrument of secondary 
tax legislation. As the directive is not directly binding but requires 
implementing legislation by the member states, it is the instrument of choice 
for sensitive areas such as taxation. Indeed, it is still the preferred 
instrument for major acts of tax harmonization such as the horizontal 
excises directive of 1992,
52 the savings directive of 2003, the introduction of 
the transitional system of VAT in 1991,
53 or the new VAT system directive 
in 2006. However, since the late 1980s the number of tax policy decisions 
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has rapidly increased and has overtaken the number of directives in the 
1990s. The Council decision is now the most common instrument of EU tax 
legislation. It is mostly used to authorize specific derogations from general 
tax directives for individual member states. In a way, it provides a safety 
valve against overly restrictive harmonization. The accelerated growth of 
tax decisions provides prima facie evidence of the increasing restrictiveness 
of EU tax harmonization and testifies to the high level of European 
involvement in national tax policy making. Finally, regulations have also 
become somewhat more common since the 1980s even though their 
absolute number is still quite low. As regulations are directly binding for 
member states and economic agents without any additional national 
legislation, member states usually try to avoid them in sensitive areas. Their 
importance In the field of taxation is indeed reduces because most of them 
lay down implementing provisions for other secondary tax law, especially 
directives. 
Fourth, there is a mild trend towards delegated tax legislation. While in 
the early decades of Euroepan integration, all tax acts emanated from the 
Council of Ministers, more recently a small but increasing number of 
decisions and regulations have been issued by the Commission. The legal 
basis of these acts is provided by “parent” legislation of the Council which 
delegates law making powers for specific purposes to the Commission. The 
horizontal excise directive, for example, delegates authority over some 
administrative aspects of the common excise system.
54 The new VAT 
system directive empowers the Commission to regulate reduced tax rates for 
gas, electricity and district heating.
55 While the substantive scope of 
delegation is limited, it is still remarkable that law-making powers are 
delegated at all given the member states’ strong insistence on retaining 
untrammelled sovereignty over taxation. 
In short, the qualitative evidence suggests that the frequency, coveranga, 
and variety of tax legislation have greatly increased. A growing number of 
issues concerning the rate, shape and administration of national taxes are 
now formally decided by the Commission and the Council. However, the 
evidence also shows that the extent of legislation varies greatly across taxes. 
Indirect taxes and especially VAT and the major excises are regulated 
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comprehensively while direct taxation is hardly regulated at all. This makes 
sense because indirect taxation has a higher potential of market distortions 
than direct daxation. It does not mean, however, that direct taxation remains 
a predominantly national affair because since the mid-1980s, the ECJ has 
developed a large body of case law on the compatibility of direct tax rules 
with primary EU law. 
4.2. ECJ Tax Jurisprudence 
The legal order of the EU empowers the ECJ to review the consistency of 
national law, including tax law, with the acquis communautaire. Cases can 
be brought by other member states, by the Commission or by private tax 
payers via the preliminary rulings procedure. Each tax case just concerns a 
particular tax rule in a particular member state but the resulting case law has 
a harmonizing effect across taxes and member states because, by providing 
detailed reasons why this particular rule is (not) in line with EU law, it 
establishes general principles of acceptable tax policy for the EU as a 
whole.
56 To be sure, these principles do not tell member states what policies 
to adopt but rather what policies not to adopt. Judicial harmonization is 
negative harmonization. This is one major difference to the positive 
harmonization effected by the Council’s secondary tax law.
57 Table 2 
provides a quantitative overview of the tax jurisprudence of the ECJ. It 
highlights four trends. 
 
-- Table 2 about here -- 
 
First, the absolute number of tax cases has increased enormously. While 
the ECJ handled only four tax cases between 1958 and 1967, it processed 
more than 400 such cases between 1998 and 2007. 
Second, the number of tax areas covered has risen. For a long time, the 
tax jurisprudence of the Court focused almost exclusively on indirect taxes 
(mostly VAT and excises). Since the 19990s, however, the number of direct 
tax cases (mostly concerning corporate and personal income taxes) has 
grown significantly. While the ECJ rendered only twenty judements on 
direct taxation between 1988 and 1997, this number increased to 101 
    
56   For a general treatment of this issue, see Stone Sweet 2004, 30-35. 
57   McLure 2007, 130. - 18 - 
between 1998 and 2007. The relative share of direct tax cases grew from 
less than ten per cent of all tax cases (1988-1997) to almost 25 per cent 
(1998-2007). All major taxes are now under constant judicial review by the 
ECJ. 
Third, the number of cases concerning the interpretation of secondary tax 
law has grown much faster than that of cases concerning primary treaty law. 
More than 70 per cent of the cases rendered between 1998 and 2007 dealt 
with secondary law (292.5 out of 417). Unsurprisingly, a closer inspection 
reveals that this share is much higher in indirect taxation where almost 98 
per cent of all VAT cases between 1998 and 2007 (203 out of 208) 
concerned secondary VAT law. This share is much lower in direct taxation 
where little secondary law exists. Only about 20 per cent of all the corporate 
tax cases (10 out of 46.5) and no case concerning personal taxes related to 
secondary tax law.
58  In other words, in indirect taxation the ECJ rules on 
the secondary legislation of the Council while in direct taxation it mostly 
rules in lieu of Councuil legislation. In the former case, the jurisprudence of 
the ECJ adds to the legal constraints implied by secondary legislation. By 
clarifying the meaning of this legislation it tends to whittle away some of 
the formula compromises and ambiguities which originally secured the 
unanimous passage of this legislation in the first place.In the later case, it 
engages in judge-made European legislation in a tax field in which the 
Council has traditionally refused to legislate because the member states 
could not or would not consider European level legislation. 
Most direct tax cases before the ECJ concern the compatitility of national 
tax provisions with the general non-discrimination and free movement 
guarantees of the EC Treaty.
59 Direct tax regimes are liable to violating 
these guarantees because historically they were designed to ensure 
efficiency and distributive fairness within national boundaries rather than 
non-discrimination and unrestricted movement across them. Governments 
have built up protective walls to prevent the mobile tax base from leaking 
out to other states by, for example, limiting tax advantages to domestic 
situations or imposing extra tax or administrative requirements on 
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international situations. In general, the ECJ has taken a very critical view on 
these arrangements, and beginning in the 1980s, started to shoot them down 
in the name of the market freedoms. This judicial onslaught triggered a 
wave of national tax reforms. Governments in Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy and elsewhere eliminated the once popular but inherently 
discriminatory imputation system of corporate taxation. Also, domestic tax 
advantages were extended to cross-border situations or eliminated altogether 
in order to make tax base definitions more internationally neutral and thus 
pre-empt anti-discrimination litigation. Indirectly, the ECJ’s tax 
jurisprudence also affected national tax rates because by eliminatingt tax 
barriers it fuelled international tax arbitrage and, hence, corporate tax 
competition in the Single Market.
60 The corporate tax jurisprudence also ha 
dimportant knock-on effects on personal taxation, for example as regards 
the treatment of individual wealth and capital income.
61 
Fourth, Table 2 shows that the tax jurisprudence of the ECJ is mainly 
characterized by two types of proceedings, references for preliminary 
rulings and infringement procedures (i.e. actors for failure to fulfil 
obligations). While the frequency of both proceedings has strongly 
increased, preliminary rulings have always outnumbered infringement 
procedures by a significant margin. In recent years (1998-2007), the ratio 
has been five to one (340 to 68). The predominance of the prelimininary 
rulings procedure gives the tax litigation before the ECJ a tax reduction bias 
because private tax payers will incur the costs of litigation only if they 
expect that a success will reduce their tax bill.
62 To the extent that private 
litigants are successful in their actions, as for the reasons just stated they 
often are, they lend encouragement to other potential litigants to follow their 
example and also reduce their tax burden by attacking restrictive national 
tax provisions for incompatibility with the Treaty freedoms. Thus, 
successful litigation begets more litigation and increases the pressure on 
national treasuries.  
Infringement proceedings are almost invariably initiated by the 
Commission. The Commission uses these proceedings in order to ensure 
member state compliance with existing EU law but also to create new law. 
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Targeting tax obstacles which the member states refuse to remove by way of 
legislative harmonization, it hopes to instigate case law which removes them 
by way of judicial harmonization.
63 The accumulation of case law may then 
in turn facilitate consensus building on legislative harmonization. 
More recently, the Commission has also started to issue non-binding 
communications on the tax jurisprudence of the ECJ, especially with regard 
to direct taxation.
64 These communications remind the member states of 
their duty to adjust national tax policy to this jurisprudence and provide 
guidance as to how to do that. They also alert private tax payers to 
promising targets of litigation and serve as thinly veiled threats that 
ultimately the Commission could initiate infringement proceedings if 
member states refuse to comply with its reading of the case law. In this way 
the Commission hopes to reinforce the negative harmonization effect of ECJ 
rulings and increase active policy coordination among the member states.
65 
4.3. Secondary Tax Legislation, ECJ Case Law, and Member 
State Autonomy 
As the density of legislative and judicial European tax laws increases, the 
substantive and procedural Treaty constraints, originally intended to 
safeguard national tax policy autonomy, turn against it. The unanimity 
requirement tends to lock the member states into a legal status quo which is 
partly not even of their own making but that of the ECJ. To be sure, each 
European tax provision, be it of legislative or of judicial origin, can be 
revised if the Council of Ministers unanimously so agrees. However, as long 
as this agreement is not forthcoming, the member states have to apply the 
old law unchanges. This stifles policy innovating and change.
66  
In the field of indirect taxation, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, for 
instance, campaigned on a pledge to reform the structure of French VAT 
rates in order to make the tax more equitable and efficient but could not 
make good of this pledge because the structure of VAT rates is regulated by 
EU law, and no unanimity among the member states for a reform of these 
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66   In a more general way, this argument is developed in Scharpf 2006. - 21 - 
regulations is in sight.
67 The hurdles to a political revision of ECJ rulings 
interpreting primary instead of secondary law are even higher as they 
require not only a unanimous decision of the member states but also 
subsequent ratification of the agreement in all member states. This gives the 
ECJ particular discretion over precisely those tax issues, most notably in 
direct taxation, which the Council cannot or will not agree to regulate by 
secondary legislation.  
In the field of direct taxation, a political revision of ECJ interpretations of 
primary law is even more difficult. First, the fact that there is no secondary 
law in this field is an indicator of the disagreement in the Council about how 
European rules in this field should look like and whether there should be 
European rules at all. This makes unanimous agreement among the member 
states revising an existing ECJ jurisprudence in this area highly unlikely. 
Second, the member states do not have the possibility of uninimouly 
adopting individual exemptions to the general rules of primary law as 
interpreted by the ECJ. This is only possible in the case of secondary law 
where more specialized decisions, even if they have to be adopted 
unanimously, can grant individual exemptions from more general directives. 
In sum, the unanimity requirement which was originally created in order to 
safeguard the member states autonomy in the field of taxation from EU 
influence now contributes to a judicialization of tax policy and thereby 
increases EU influence instead of reducing it.  
To the extent that European tax law constrains national taxation, 
considerations of market neutrality and integration come to domitate fiscal 
and distributive considerations in tax poliy making. Partly this is due to the 
substantive Treaty requirement that all secondary tax law has to serve a 
market integration rationale. Partly it follows from the ECJ’s refusal to 
accept the revenue needs of the member states as an “imperative 
requirement of public interest”.
68 In any case, taxationis not treated as an 
end in itself but as a means to an end. It has no positive content as in 
domestic tax policy – where the financing of public goods or the promotion 
of distributive justice are popular and legitimate justifications of tax policy 
decisions – but only a negative one, namely the elimination of obstacles to 
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market integration and neutrality.
69 Hence, the spread of European tax law 
means not only that national taxes are increasingly shaped by EU rules but 
also that these rules are alien and sometimes histile to the policy 
considerations which dominate domestic tax policy discourses. 
The strong quantitative  growth of EU tax law and ECJ tax jurisprudence 
which we analysed in the preceding section makes a significant qualitative 
difference for national taxation. Taxes remain national but are increasingly 
constrained by European rules and regulations. The constraining effect 
varies across taxes. Indirect taxes are more thoroughly regulated than direct 
taxes and corporate taxes more thoroughly than personal income taxes. It 
also varies across tax instruments. Tax systems and tax base definitions tend 
to be more narrowly circumscribed by European rules than tax rates. Most 
importantly, there are no binding European rules on maximum rates. The 
member states remain free to increase rates in order to raise more revenue 
even though their choice of rate structures and minimum rates is subject to 
legislative constraints in VAT and excises taxation and to constraints from 
tax competition in corporate taxation and indirectly also in personal income 
taxation. The EU has not taken over tax policy making but despite 
substantive and procedural safeguards taken by the member states is deeply 
involved in it. 
5. Conclusion 
Our empirical study of the last 50 years of EU involvement in taxation has 
yielded a seemingly paradoxical result. On first sight, the adherents of the 
popular “no taxation” thesis are right: The EU does not have an income 
which even remotely resembles a tax. Over half a century, it has not 
managed to come closer to a tax-based financing which would have come 
from individuals and corporate actors and which would have created a 
strong link between the EU and these actors. On the contrary, its income has 
become ever more intergovernmental and dependent on member state 
contributions. Although the argument that the EU budget was too small to 
have a stustantial macro-economic impact has been made already three 
decades ago,
70 member states have prevented such a growth of the EU 
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budget, even after the creation of Economic and Monetary Union which has 
further strengthened the case for a larger EU budget. The authority of the 
EU to act in the field of taxation is narrowly circumstribed and includes 
only matters which might have an impact on the Internal Market. In 
addition, the unanimity rule has been maintained in the Treaty despite the 
ever more widespread use of qualified majority voting in other areas in 
order to prevent any enchroachements upon member state prerogatives in 
the field of taxation. While the right to raise taxes is among the foremost 
rights and achievements of democratic parliaments, the European 
Parliament does not have this right despite the strong increase of its powers 
during the last decades. It seems that the EU is not following the 
development path of the Western federal states of the 19
th century which 
began as fiscally weak polities but managed to obtain their own federal 
power to tax and were thus able to draw on an independent financial 
resource. On a first glance, therefore, the EU is fiscally weak. It has no 
independent income from taxation, it cannot increase its own budget and use 
if for macroeconomic stabilization or redistributive purpose, and there is no 
fiscal link between the EU and its citizens. 
All this has been claimed by the proponents of the “no taxation” thesis. 
While it is true, it is not the whole story. On the contrary, the EU is actively 
pursuing tax policy which is of a regulatory instead of a fiscal nature. The 
unanimity requirement of the Treaty has not prevented this increasingly 
activist stance as whitnessed by the constant growth of tax legislation. In 
addition, the European Court of Justice has used the Internal Market 
justification provided by the Treaty to develop its own dense set of tax case 
law. The crucial issue here is that these are cases of hierarchical decisions 
which circumvent the high consensus requirements which usually prevail in 
the Council.
71 As a result, the EU has no taxes of its own but strongly 
constrains and regulates the member states ability to raise taxes. The 
member states are still in possession of their monopoly of taxation but 
subject to numerous constraints from hundreds of legal provisions and ECJ 
rulings.  
This has important consequences for our understanding of the EU 
multilevel system. First, the strong growth of the European regulation of 
taxation escapes the attention of those approaches who see multilevel 
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governance as a gradual power sharing across levels of government. On first 
sight, their assessment is correct: Each member state has a veto against the 
adoption of European tax legislation. This justifies the low score taxation 
receives on scales looking at the locus of decision-making.
72 But this focus 
on the sharing of decision-making authority suggests that low scores leave 
member states’ tax policy authority intact. However, 200 pieces of tax 
legislation adopted in the last decade suggest the contrary. The low scores 
on the decision-making scale have not prevented the adoption of these 
measures. Once adopted, however, the unanimity requirement also makes a 
change in the existing tax legislation or its abolishment more difficult. The 
gradual view on multilevel governance also focuses on standard legislative 
procedures and leaves judicial policy-making aside. However, ECJ rulings 
are purely supranational measures without any member state influence and 
should hence receive a value of five on the Lindberg-scale. More than 400 
rulings in the last decade point to the significance of case law in taxation. 
Far from being slowed down by autonomy-preserving decision-making 
procedures, taxation is characterized by a combination of intergovernmental 
decision-making with supranational case law, a combination to which 
Joseph Weiler more than 25 years ago has attributed much of the dynamism 
behind European integration.
73 
Second, our analysis of the fiscal structure of the EU also sheds some 
doubt on the second interpretation of multilevel governance in the EU which 
sees the EU as a regulatory polity. The regulatory polity view makes a 
distinction between efficiency-oriented, Pareto-improving regulation of a 
transnational European market and (re)distributional, symbolic, policing, 
military etc. functions of national politics. It is based on the classic liberal 
divide between politics and markets. Market-regulation is considered to be 
either highly technical (as, for instance, in the case of the testing of medical 
drugs or health and safety standards at the workplace) or serves to correct 
market failures (as in the case of competition rules). Because it explicitly 
avoids political issues relating to core state functions such as redistribution, 
education, policing or defense, it relies mainly on output legitimacy and can 
do with the weak democratic or input legitimacy of the EU.
74 Regulation in 
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this sense is and can be unpolitical. But this is exactly the reason why the 
EU could develop into a mature regulatory polity. Its legitimacy basis is not 
sufficient for assuming core state functions. 
At this point, the positive theory of the regulatory polity turns into a 
normative one which suggests that the EU should stick to its original 
mandate of creating a liberal transnational market and refrain from 
interfering into the political functions of the member states.
75 We do not 
criticise the normative implications of the regulatory polity model. Our 
argument here is that regulation in the EU has gone far beyond what was 
originally understood by it. While it does not itself levy taxes, the EU 
regulates the member states’ ability to tax. Taxation provides a critical 
illustration of how the EU does not limit itself to market regulation but 
massively interferes with core state functions. The EU does not only 
regulate markets, it also regulates governments and politics.
76 
Both the proponents of the “no taxation” thesis and of the regulatory 
polity model are right – but only if seen together, their views capture what 
multilevel governance in the EU is about. The “no taxation” thesis is right 
because the EU does indeed not tax individuals or corporate citizens. It also 
has not police forces of its own, does not oblige children to go to school, has 
no army and no encompassing redistributive welfare system. It does not take 
away the core functions from the member states. The regulatory polity 
model is also right. But regulation is by no means restricted to technical 
detail or market failures alone. The Internal Market justification for 
legislation at the EU level has been interpreted very extensively not only by 
the ECJ but also by the member states and led to the creation of a huge body 
of European tax law.
77 European tax law comes in a highly technical guise 
which is dry to read and may be boring to many. This may explain why it 
has been overlooked by observers who merely focus on the visible revenue 
side of taxation and omit the regulatory aspect. But tax regulation is 
eminently political as it touches upon a core power of the state. 
This view of the EU as a regulatory polity which we illustrated by taking 
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taxation as an example may be valid for other core state activities as well. It 
rejects the zero-sum logic that certain powers have either to be possessed by 
the European or by the national level, and that a gain of one level is a loss 
for the other. The EU is not in the process of acquiring the resources and 
powers which its member states have obtained in long fights until the 20
th 
century.
78 The member states keep these powers but exercise them within a 
European regulatory polity which they cannot completely control.  
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Table 1: EU secondary tax legislation,
* 1958-2007 
  1958-1967 1968-1977 1978-1987 1988-1997 1998-2007 
by tax area  
VAT  2  6.5 24 79  94.5
** 
Excise  0  7.5 15 30  65.5
** 
Corporate  tax  0 0 0 2 3 
Personal  Income  tax 0 0 0 0  11 
Administrative 
cooperation and 
miscellaneous  tax  0 6 2 9  25 
by legal instrument 
Regulations  0 0 0 8  13 
Directives  2 19 35 35 39 
Decisions 0  1  6  77  147 
by issuing institution 
Council  2 20 41  109  179 
Commission  0  0  0 11 20 
       
Total tax 
legislation    2 20 41  120  199 
Source: Eur-Lex database, own calculations 
Notes:  
* Secondary tax legislation refers to binding legislative acts of the Council or the 
Commission concerning the national tax policy of the member states. Non-binding 
recommendations, opinions, etc. are not included. Also not included are binding acts 
concerning the customs code, state aid law or own resources.  
** As some directives pertain to VAT and excises alike, for example directives on tax 
exemptions for individual travellers. They have been counted as 0.5 for each of these 
taxes.  
 
  
  Table 2: Tax jurisprudence
* of the ECJ, 1958-2007 
 
  1958-1967 1968-1977 1978-1987 1988-1997 1998-2007 
by tax area  
VAT 1  17  33.5**  116  208 
Excise and other 
indirect tax  2  19  49.5**  68  102 
Corporate tax  0  1  2  8  46.5
**** 
Personal tax
*** 1  2  2  12  54.5
**** 
Administrative 
cooperation and 
miscellaneous tax  0  0  1  5  6 
by legal subject  
Primary  law  4 29 56 68  124.5
***** 
Secondary  law  0 10 32  141  292.5
***** 
by type of procedure 
Preliminary  ruling  3 32 64  158  340 
Infringement (failure 
to fulfil obligation)  1  5  24  49  68 
Other 0  2  0  2  9 
       
Total tax 
jurisprudence   4 39 88  209  417 
Source: Eur-lex database, own calculations 
Notes:  
*tax jurisprudence refers to judgements of the ECJ on the compatibility of national tax 
law and European law. Orders are not included.  
**Some judgements apply to VAT and excises. They are counted as 0,5 against each tax.  
***Personal tax includes income, wealth, and inheritance taxes.  
****Some judgements apply to corporate and personal taxes. They are counted as 0.5 
against each tax.   
*****Some judgements refer to primary and secondary law. They are counted as 0.5 
against each legal subject. 
 
 
 
 